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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
plier's oral estimate." 2 Although the Campbell decision helps to remove some
of the worry involved in construction bidding situations, the last few hours
before the prime contract deadline will remain a hectic and frustrating time
for both general contractors and suppliers." ,3 After Campbell, North Carolina
contractors can rely with more certainty on the oral estimates that potential
suppliers make during the last few minutes before a bid deadline."' 4 The Camp-
bell decision, therefore, reflects the more popular view on the issue of pro-
missory estoppel and the statute of frauds1' 5 and establishes a clear rule in
North Carolina that allows a court to apply promissory estoppel to enforce
an oral contract for the sale of goods despite the UCC's statute of frauds."
16
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CVIL RIGHTS
A. Civil Rights Actions: Borrowing State Statutes of Limitations
Individuals seeking to redress grievances of racial discrimination by private
employers may file complaints with a state administrative agency' or in federal
112. See 708 F.2d at 932-34. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Campbell provides persuasive
authority to North Carolina courts and practitioners because the Fourth Circuit decided the case
as the court believed the North Carolina courts would decide it on the same facts. See id. at
933-34; see supra note 25 (discussion of Erie doctrine). The Campbell decision should approx-
imate what a North Carolina court would have decided because the Fourth Circuit merely extended
the promissory estoppel doctrine that the North Carolina courts expressly had approved. See
supra note 27 (discussion of Wachovia Bank case which recognized doctrine of promissory estop-
pel in North Carolina).
113. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (description of bidding process and prob-
lems that arise).
114. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussion of importance and effect of Camp-
bell on North Carolina law).
115. See supra notes 41-97 and accompanying text (discussion and analysis of decisions of
other courts).
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (practical effect of Campbell holding on
North Carolina law).
1. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-303 (1973) (establishing Colorado civil rights com-
mission); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 1 (1979) (establishing Human Relations Commission); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6 § 56 (West 1983) (establishing Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination). State legislatures have established civil rights agencies to resolve complaints of
discrimination on a state level. See CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY REviEw, STATE AGENCIES AND
THEIR ROLE IN FEDERAL Civii. Rioirrs ENFORCEMENT 1 (1977) (survey of state civil rights agen-
cies). Each state provides its commission with specific powers and duties. See id. at 17-21, Appendix
B; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-391 (1983) (commission may study problems concerning
human relations, promote goodwill and promote equality of opportunity for all citizens); S.C.
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court under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2 Agency enabling
statutes provide specific time limitations for complaints filed with the state
CODE ANN. § 1-13-70 (Law Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1983) (commission may promulgate rules and
regulations in accordance with statute, form policies to effect statute, create advisory agencies,
issue publications, hold hearings, receive complaints, and issue subpoenas); VA. CODE § 15.1-687.3
(1983) (commission may promote policies to ensure equal opportunity and serve as agency for
receiving, investigating and assisting in resolution of citizen complaints of discriminatory prac-
tices). The Maryland Human Relations Commission primarily focuses upon discrimination in
housing, employment, and public accommodations. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5-8, 14-30
(1983) (reviewing unlawful practices in housing, employment and public accommodations). Arti-
cle 49B governs both the substantive and procedural aspects of Maryland's discrimination law.
See id.
2. Act of Apr. 9, 1966, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 reenacted as Act of May 31, 1870, Ch. 114,
16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (1976). Section 1981 provides that all citizens shall
have the same right as white citizens to make and enforce contracts, sue parties, and give evidence.
See id. While § 1981 refers specifically to the enforcement of contracts,the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted § 1981 as prohibiting racial discrimination in private employment. See Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (affirming federal court decisions in recognizing
that § 1981 affords federal remedy against racial discrimination in private employment). Con-
gress enacted § 1981 under the authority of the thirteenth amendment to secure civil rights for
blacks after the Civil War. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (§ 1981 constitutes
exercise of federal legislative power under § 2 of thirteenth amendment); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3,22 (1883) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted under authority of thirteenth amendment to
eliminate incidents of slavery); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882) (Congress enacted
Civil Rights Act of 1866 by virtue of § 2 of thirteenth amendment); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII,
§ 2 (Congress may enforce prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude with appropriate
legislation). See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
33, 35-68 (1968) (reviewing legislative history of § 1981) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, the Supreme Court reviewed the nature of an action
based on § 1981. 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). The Supreme Court determined that § 1981 pro-
vides a specific federal remedy for victims of racial discrimination in private employment. Id.
at 460. If the complainant wins the suit against his employer, the court may award equitable
and legal relief, and need not restrict awards of back pay. Id. The Johnson Court observed that
while conciliation and persuasion are desirable means to eliminate discrimination, private suits
provide an alternative to agency actions for resolving disputes. Id. at 461.
Individuals seeking to redress grievances of discrimination by private employers also may
proceed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. 88-352, § 730, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-4) (1981) (creating
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). Under Title VII, a complainant must file a
discrimination charge with the appropriate state agency and wait 60 days from the date of filing
before filing a grievance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (EEOC) Id. A
complainant may address the EEOC prior to the expiration of the 60-day period only if the state
agency has terminated the complainant's proceeding. Id. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
the Supreme Court examined the procedural and substantive aspects of Title VII actions. 421
U.S. 454, 457-58 (1975). The Johnson Court noted that the EEOC investigates individual com-
plaints and promotes voluntary adherence to Title VII requirements. Id. at 458. If the EEOC
is unsuccessful in resolving the complaint, an individual may demand a right-to-sue letter and
institute a Title VII action personally. Id. If the complainant wins an award of backpay, he may
recover at the maximum the amount of money lost over a two-year period. Id.; 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5g.
The Supreme Court also determined that the legislative history of Title VII reflected Congress'
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his or her rights under a federal civil rights
statute such as § 1981. See 421 U.S. at 459; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
44-54 (1975) (examining Title VII actions). See generally Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §
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agency.3 Congress, however, did not provide the Civil Rights Acts with periods
of limitation.4 Federal courts, therefore, must borrow an appropriate statute
of limitations from the state in which the action is pending.' If state law
specifically provides a statute of limitations for actions filed under federal
law, that statute is applicable. 6 If, however, no statute is directly applicable,
federal courts must choose the limitation period applicable to a state cause
of action that is most analogous to the federal cause of action. 7 In McNutt
1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 339, 342 (1976) (analyzing differences
between Title VII and § 1981); P. WEinER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIOATION 1979, 401-38
(1979) (comparing litigation under Title VII and § 1981).
3. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 9 (1983) (individuals must file complaint with
Maryland Human Relations Committee within 6 months of occurrence of alleged discriminatory
conduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-90 (Law Co-op. 1982) (individuals required to file complaint
with South Carolina Commission on Human Affairs within 180 days of occurrence of alleged
discriminatory conduct); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-10 (1982) (individuals required to file complaint
with West Virginia Human Rights Commission within 90 days of occurrence of alleged
discriminatory conduct).
4. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1974) (Congress did not
provide specific federal statute of limitations for cause of action under § 1981). Congress did
not incorporate periods of limitations into the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. See Act of April
9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (1981) (all citizens shall have same right to make and enforce
contracts); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982) (1981)
(all citizens shall have same right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal property); Acts of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284, and April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2,
17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985) (1981) (authorizes cause of action for conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights).
5. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 295 (1945) (Supreme Court generally has
interpreted Congress' silence to mean that federal courts should apply state limitations period);
See, e.g., American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 n.27 (1974) (when
Congress does not designate a period of limitations federal courts generally look to local law
to obtain limitations period); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (absent period of
limitations for federal assault charge, court should apply state statute of limitations); Campbell
v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895) (absent limitations period for federal patent infringement
action, courts reasonably may assume that Congress intended courts to apply state statutes of
limitation). See generally, 2 J. Mooan & J. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3.07[2] (2d
1983) (survey of federal laws which do not have limitations periods and criteria for selecting
state statutes of limitations); C. Wi.lrr, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 394 (4th ed. 1984)
(discussing rules for applying state statutes of limitations to federal actions without limitations
periods); Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in
Private Employment, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 56, 76 (1972) (discussing selection of state
statutes of limitation for § 1981 actions); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions,
53 CoLUM. L. REv. 68 (1953) (review of federal statutes without limitations periods and criteria
for selecting state statutes of limitations).
6. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) (two-year limitations period applicable
to federal actions without period of limitations); NEB. REv. STAT. § 525-219 (1975) (three-year
limitations period applicable to federal actions without period of limitations); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 28-3-104 (1980) (one-year limitations period for actions brought under federal civil rights statute).
7. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1974) (absent period of
limitations under § 1981, court must apply most appropriate limitation period that state law pro-
vides). See generally, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976
ARIz. ST. L.J. 97 (examining circuit and district court selections of state statutes of limitations);
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v. Duke Precision Dental and Orthodontic Laboratories,8 the Fourth Circuit
considered which period of limitations to apply in an action based on section
1981.
In McNutt, the plaintiff alleged that his employer had violated section
1981 by firing the plaintiff because of his race.'" The plaintiff had filed his
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
approximately one and one-half years after his discharge.'" The district court
recognized that Maryland does not provide a specific period of limitations
for actions filed under the Civil Rights Acts.12 The court determined, however,
that article 49B of the Maryland Code, 1 3 which governs complaints filed with
the Maryland Human Relations Commission,'I and section 1981 had substan-
tial commonality of purpose.' 5 The district court held, therefore, that the six-
month limitations period applicable to article 49B applied to McNutt's claim
Developments, supra note 2, at 219 (survey of statutes of limitations applied to § 1981 actions);
Note, A Call for Uniformity: Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE
L. REV. 61 (1979) (reviewing history of § 1981 and problems in applying state statutes of limitations).
8. 698 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 677.
10. See Brief for Appellant at 2-3, McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental and Orthodontic
Laboratories, Inc., 698 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. Plain-
tiff McNutt was a black male who worked at Duke Precision Dental and Orthodontic Laboratories.
Id. at 2. McNutt, alleged that on February 28, 1980, a fellow employee, Tankin, assaulted McNutt
with a loaded gun because McNutt was black. Id. at 3. McNutt called the police who arrested
Tankin. Id. at 3-4. McNutt alleged that his employer, Charles Duke, attempted to impede the
police investigation of the assault. Id. at 3. McNutt also alleged that Duke failed to protect McNutt
by not firing Tankin. Id. at 4. Duke instead fired McNutt in March 1980. Id.
In addition to alleging a racially discriminatory discharge, McNutt alleged that Duke and
Tankin violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by attempting to convince the state prosecutors to drop
the charges against Tankin. Id. at 4; see Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284, and April
20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1983)) (authorizing private cause
of action for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights). The Fourth Circuit observed that § 1985(3)
provided a remedy for violations of federal and constitutional rights. 698 F.2d at 680. The McNutt
court recognized, however, that McNutt did not have a federal right to foreclose pleas of lenien-
cy. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that McNutt could not sustain an action based on
§ 1985(3). Id.
11. See 698 F.2d at 677.
12. See id..
13. MD. ANN. CODE articles 49B (1983).
14. See id. (creating Maryland Human Relations Commission). To initiate a proceeding
with the Maryland Human Relations Commission, an individual must file a complaint with the
Commission. See id. § 9a. The Commission then responds by investigating the validity of the
complaint. Id. §§ 9b, 10a. If the complaint is valid, the Commission attempts to resolve the
conflict through conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. § 10b. If the parties fail to reach
an agreement, the parties must participate in a hearing. Id. § 1la. The Commission then may
subpoena any witnesses and documents needed as evidence. Id § lid. If complainant wins, the
Commission may apply appropriate equitable relief. Id. § Ile. Article 49B limits the assessment
of a backpay award to a two-year period and requires the deduction of interim earnings from
the actual award. See id.
15. See 698 F.2d at 678; O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980) (defining com-
monality of purpose test), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); supra notes 70-73 and accompany-
ing text (analyzing O'Hara decision).
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and barred the plaintiff's cause of action.' 6 The plaintiff appealed to the Fourth
Circuit arguing that article 49B governed only the procedures for administrative
complaints and did not apply to a federal action based on section 1981.1,
The McNutt court observed that article 5-101 of the Maryland Code'8
provided a three-year limitations period for all causes of action that did not
have a specific limitation.' 9 The Fourth Circuit suggested that the three-year
limitation for article 5-101 should apply to a section 1981 action unless the
six month limitation provided by article 49B was more appropriate." To deter-
mine which limitations period to apply to McNutt's cause of action, the Fourth
Circuit compared the procedures necessary for initiating an action under arti-
cle 49B and section 1981. 21 The McNutt court observed that article 49B mere-
ly requires an individual to present a grievance to a commission employee
in an informal manner to initiate an agency proceeding and toll the limita-
tions period.2 2 The commission then investigates the grievance.2 3 In contrast,
an individual seeking a judicial remedy under section 1981 must first obtain
counsel and allow substantial time for preparation before filing a complaint.
2 4
The Fourth Circuit also examined the objectives of article 49B and sec-
16. See 698 F.2d at 678.
17. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at 5. The defendants in McNutt argued that
article 49B was the state statute most analagous to § 1981 and that the district court therefore
was correct in applying 49B's six-month limitation period. See Brief for Appellee, McNutt v.
Duke Precision Dental and Orthodontic Laboratories, Inc., 698 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellee]; MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 9(a) (1983) (providing six-month limita-
tions period for complaints filed with Maryland Human Relations Commission). The defendants
argued alternatively that if article 49(B) was inapplicable, Maryland's one year statute of limita-
tions for assault, libel, or slander actions barred the plaintiff's claim. 698 F.2d at 679; see MD.
CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1980) (individuals must file actions for assault, battery,
libel, slander within one year from date of alleged act). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
McNutt's complaint contained allegations of assault and defamation but concluded that McNutt
ultimately sought to recover for the defendants' discriminatory conduct. See 698 F.2d at 679.
The McNutt court also noted that the alleged slander occurred after the defendant had terminated
McNutt and therefore did not contribute to McNutt's § 1981 claim. See id.
In addition to the arguments that the plaintiff and defendants advanced, the Fourth Circuit
received an amicus brief from Record Data of Maryland. See id. Record Data of Maryland urged
the Fourth Circuit to transfer the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals to enable the state
courts of Maryland to determine which statute of limitations was most appropriate for an action
based on § 1981. See id. The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
did not have more experience than a federal court in determining the appropriateness of a state
statute unintended for application to a federal cause of action. See id. The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 placed the burden of selecting an appropriate state statute on the
federal courts. See id.; Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)) (whenever Civil Rights Acts
are deficient in provisions necessary to furnish remedy, courts must apply state law if federal
law is unsuitable).
18. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1980).
19. 698 F.2d at 677.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 678-79.





tion 1981.25 The McNutt court determined that under article 49B, the ad-
ministrative agency tries to eliminate the employer's discriminatory conduct
by negotiation and persuasion. 26 A short period of limitations is desirable since
the chances for reconciliation decrease with time. 21 The Fourth Circuit noted
that complaints filed under section 1981, however, initiated an adversarial pro-
cess and functioned as vehicles for litigation.28 The McNutt court noted that
because of the differing objectives of administrative and judicial remedies,
statutes of limitation applicable to judicial actions generally provide longer
limitations periods than statutes applicable to administrative proceedings. 29
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that short limitations periods might
be desirable in resolving controversies over employee discharges.3" The McNutt
court recognized, however, that federal courts must apply a limitations period
incident to the state action that is most analogous to the federal cause of
action.3 The McNutt court determined that statutory limitations upon the
informal initiation of administrative proceedings were not applicable to a
judicial action based on section 1981. 3" The Fourth Circuit, therefore, found
the three-year limitations period more appropriate for McNutt's action and
vacated the district court's dismissal of McNutt's section 1981 claim.
The Fourth Circuit's determination that section 1981 and article 49B have
dissimilar procedures and goals is consistent with other decisions that have
identified the nature and origin of each statute.34 The Supreme Court has noted
that Congress enacted section 1981 under the authority of section two of the





30. Id. at 678.
31. See id. at 678. The McNutt court noted that a majority of circuits have held that the
period of limitations for an agency proceeding to be inapplicable to actions based on § 1981.
See id. at 678 n.3; Zuniga v. AM-FAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 330, 384 n.5 (10th Cir. 1978) (limita-
tions periods for state agency proceedings are inapplicable to civil right's actions filed in courts
of law); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 226 (8th Cir. 1976) (three-year
limitation period for liability based on statute more appropriate for § 1981 claim than 180-day
limit for agency complaint); Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1975)
(six-year limitations period for liability created by state statute more appropriate for § 1981 claim
than one-year limitation period for complaints filed with Ohio Civil Rights Commission); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvesters Co., 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir.) (statute
governing civil actions without specified periods of limitation more appropriate for § 1981 claim
than statute specifying 120-day limitation on claims filed with Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). The Fourth Circuit also acknowledged that the
First Circuit represented the minority view. 698 F.2d at 678; see Holden v. Commission Against
Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30, 33 (Ist Cir.) (six-month period of limitations for agency proceedings
is most appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 103
S. Ct. 97 (1982); Hussey v. Sullivan, 651 F.2d 74, 76 (Ist Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
893 (1980).
32. See 698 F.2d at 680.
33. See id. at 680.
34. See supra note 2 (reviewing cases that document § 1981 origins in thirteenth amend-
ment); infra note 36 (citing cases documenting history of Human Relations Commission).
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thirteenth amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery."
Maryland state courts have determined that the Maryland legislature created
the Human Relations Commission to study ways to promote good will and
to make periodic proposals to the governor.36 Other courts examining judicial
and administrative procedures and remedies have concluded that federally pro-
tected constitutional rights are distinct from and exceed those rights created
by a state civil rights statute.3 7 Courts, therefore, should not circumscribe
federal causes of action with rules applicable to agency proceedings. 38
The McNutt court's decision also is consistent with policies that the
Supreme Court has developed in decisions involving section 1981 .39 In Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency,4 the Supreme Court considered whether the timely
filing of a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) tolled the limitations period for an action based on the same facts
under section 1981.' The Supreme Court compared the purpose, procedure,
and remedies involved in actions filed with the EEOC and actions filed under
section 1981.,2 The Johnson court concluded that although directed towards
similar ends, administrative and judicial remedies are separate and distinct. '
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that a timely filing with the EEOC did
not toll the statute of limitations for a section 1981 action. 44 In McNutt, the
Fourth Circuit similarly recognized distinctions between agency and judicial
proceedings.
45
35. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (Civil Rights of 1866 enacted under authority
of thirteenth amendment to eliminate badges and incidents of slavery).
36. See Prince George's County v. Commission on Human Relations, 40 Md. App. 473,
475-86, 392 A.2d 105, 108-11 (1978) (reviewing original purpose of Maryland Human Relations
Commission), vacated on other grounds, 285 Md. 205, 401 A.2d 661 (1979); Gutwein v. Easton
Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 575, 325 A.2d 740, 746-47 (1974) (historical discussion of Human
Relations Commission), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
37. See Evans v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland, 535 F. Supp. 499, 503,
504, 506 (D. Md. 1982) (violation of § 1981 more serious than violation of state civil rights statute
due to constitutional origin of § 1981); Chambers v. Omaha Public School, 536 F.2d 222, 226
(6th Cir. 1976) (administrative procedures and remedies not comparable to plenary judicial powers
available in § 1981 actions).
38. See Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855, 856 (4th Cir. 1973) (modern civil rights acts
not meant to circumscribe broad effect of early civil rights statutes).
39. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (administrative and
judicial remedies are separate, distinct and independent); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (highlighting differences between administrative and judicial remedies).
40. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
41. Id. at 455.
42. See id. at 457-61 (comparing Title VII to section 1981); supra note 2 (reviewing Johnson
Court's analysis of difference between § 1981 and Title VII).
43. 421 U.S. at 461.
44. Id. at 466. Although the Johnson Court determined that filing a complaint with the
EEOC did not toll the statute of limitations for a § 1981 action, the Supreme Courts limited
grant of certiorari foreclosed consideration of which state statute of limitations was the most
appropriate for a § 1981 action. Id. at 462 n.7.
45. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing McNutt court's comparison
of administrative and procedural remedies).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that absent a specific federal limita-
tions period for an action based on section 1981, federal courts must apply
the most appropriate limitation period that state law provides." The Supreme
Court also has recognized that the state statute of limitations that a court
selects must be compatible with the national policy inherent in the federal
cause of action.4 7 The Court has refrained, however, from indicating a
preference for a specific type of statute. 8 As a result, the decisions of the
circuits vary depending upon the analysis that a court uses to determine
appropriateness"9 and the state statutes available for consideration.5 '
In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 1 for
46. See supra note 5 (reviewing Supreme Court's policy of applying state statutes of limita-
tions to federal actions without periods of limitation).
47. See Autoworkers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966) (characterization of ac-
tion for purposes of selecting period of limitations is ultimately question of federal law). In Oc-
cidental Life Insurance Co. of California v. EEOC, the Supreme Court warned that state legislatures
did not create periods of limitations with national interests in mind. 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
Therefore, federal courts must ensure that the state statute of limitations selected will not frustrate
or interfere with the implementation of the national policy inherent in the federal cause of action. Id.
48. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1975), aff'g 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975).
In Runyon, the Fourth Circuit determined that in Virginia the two-year statute of limitations
for personal injuries governed actions brought under § 1981. See 515 F.2d at 1097. The Runyon
Court declared that the Supreme Court would not displace the Fourth Circuit's judgment especially
because the Virginia district courts applied the same two-year statute of limitations to § 1981
actions in Virginia. 427 U.S. at 180-81. The Runyon Court observed that when a federal right
is dependent upon the interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court would accept the state
court's conclusions, even if a new examination of the issue by the Supreme Court would result
in a different interpretation. Id. at 181; see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
426 n.7 (1975) (Johnson Court declined to consider appropriateness of state statute of limitations
applied).
49. See Stafford v. Muscogee County Board of Education, 688 F.2d 1383, 1389 (5th Cir.
1982) (court selected period of limitations applicable to actions for recovery of wages, overtime
or damages because of remedy plaintiff desired); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 334 (7th
Cir. 1977) (court selected limitations period applicable to civil actions created by statute by deter-
mining which statute would govern an analogous action brought in state court). In Burns v. Sullivan,
the First Circuit based its selection of a state statute of limitations on four factors. 619 F.2d
99, 105 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980). The Burns court first considered the nature
of the cause of action. Id. Second, the court identified analagous state causes of action. Id. Third,
the court examined the state statutes of limitations applicable to the state causes of action. Id.
Finally, the court determined which period of limitations would be most appropriate under federal
law. Id.
50. See Burns v.Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 105 (1st Cir. 1980) (court selected six-month agency
statute over tort and contract statute of limitations), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980); Keyse
v. California Texas Oil Corp., 509 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (court selected three-year statute
of limitations for actions based on statute); Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State
College, 590 F.2d 470 477 (3d Cir. 1978) (court selected six-year statute for wrongful interference
with employment contracts).
51. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). In Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of International Harvestor Co., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant company
maintained a discriminatory hiring policy designed to exclude blacks from employment as
bricklayers. 427 F.2d at 479. The defendants argued that the district court correctly dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint because the 120-day period for filing a complaint with the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission of Illinois barred the plaintiff's action. Id. at 488.
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example, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the 120-day limitations period
applicable to a claim filed with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission to an action based on section 1981.2 The Waters court noted that
actions filed under section 1981 differed from administrative remedies because
in section 1981 actions the private litigant had the entire burden of
investigation." In addition, while administrative remedies promoted concilia-
tion, individuals usually sought judicial relief when conciliation had failed.4
The Seventh Circuit held, therefore, that agency limitations periods were in-
appropriate for actions based on section 1981."
In Mason v. Owen-Illinois, Inc." the Sixth Circuit considered whether
to apply a one-year administrative agency limitation to an action based on
section 1981.1' The Sixth Circuit observed that the Ohio Civil Rights Act58
specified a one-year limitation for complaints that the Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission filed.5 9 The court determined that the agency statute by its terms did
not apply to actions that private litigants commenced. 60 The Mason court
selected instead the six-year period of limitations applicable to civil actions
based on a statute.
61
Only the First Circuit has determined consistently that agency statutes of
limitations are appropriate for federal civil rights actions. 62 In Carter v. Super-
markets General Corp. ,63 the First Circuit considered whether to apply the
Massachusetts six-month agency limitation, a three-year tort limitation, or a
six-year contract limitation to an action based on section 1981 .64 The agency
statute in Carter governed complaints filed with the Massachusetts Commis-




56. 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975). In Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant company refused to promote the plaintiff and subsequently discharged the
plaintiff solely because of his race. Id. at 521. The plaintiff filed his complaint approximately
two years after the alleged occurrence of discriminatory conduct. Id. at 522.
57. Id.
58. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (Baldwin 1982).
59. 517 F.2d at 522.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1982) (six-month
period of limitations for agency proceedings is most appropriate limitations period for civil rights
actions); Holden v. Commissioner Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30, 33 (Ist Cir. 1982) (same);
Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 107 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980).
63. 684 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1982). In Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., the plaintiff
alleged that her employer had discriminated against her because of her race and sex. Id. at 189.
Consequently, after approximately six months of employment with the company, the plaintiff
resigned. Id. One year after the plaintiff's resignation, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought reemploy-
ment with the company. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the employer refused to rehire her for
discriminatory reasons. Id. The plaintiff filed an action under § 1981 and Title VII approximately




sion Against Discrimination. The Carter court suggested, as did earlier First
Circuit decisions, that if federal claims had longer limitation periods than state
claims, individuals would not seek administrative remedies and federal courts
would be overwhelmed with personnel disputes." The Carter court consequently
held that a complaint alleging racial discrimination under section 1981 was
not subject to a general contract or tort statute of limitations because
Massachusetts provided a statute that was more analogous to the federal cause
of action.1
7
The Fourth Circuit's holding in McNutt effectively revises the Fourth Cir-
cuit's prior standards for determining which state statute of limitations to apply
to federal causes of action without periods of limitation." In O'Hara v.
Kovens,1" the Fourth Circuit used the commonality of purpose test to deter-
mine which Maryland statute of limitations to apply to a federal securities
action.7 0 The O'Hara court noted that the commonality of purpose test re-
quires courts to determine the policy behind the federal action and then to
identify a state statute having similar policy considerations. 7' The O'Hara court
suggested that courts should apply the statute of limitations applicable to the
similar state statute regardless of whether the state cause of action operated
differently than the federal cause of action.7 The McNutt court indicated that
application of the commonality of purpose test could lead to anomalous
results.73 Thus, to ensure an accurate determination of which statute was most
appropriate for section 1981 actions, the Fourth Circuit's decision in McNutt
encourages examination of the objectives and procedural aspects of the state
and federal statutes.
74
In McNutt, the Fourth Circuit determined that Maryland courts may not
65. Id. at 189 n.3; see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 6, § 56 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (creating
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West
1982) (defining procedures for filing complaint with Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination).
66. 684 F.2d at 190.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (reviewing prior Fourth Circuit standards
for selecting state statutes of limitation).
69. 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
70. Id. at 17. In O'Hara, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. at 15, 17; Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, Title 1, § 10,
48 Stat. 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does
not have a specified period of limitations. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210
n.29 (1976) (Congress did not provide statute of limitations for civil actions under § 10(b)).
71. 625 F.2d at 18.
72. Id.
73. 698 F.2d at 678. The McNutt court implied that use of the "commonality of purpose"
test could lead to imprecise results because the defendant in McNutt could argue that Title VII
and § 1981 had a substantial commonality of purpose since both statutes prohibited racial discrimina-
tion in employment. Id. at 678; See supra note 2 (comparing Title VII and § 1981). The defendant
in McNutt (then could allege that McNutt had to bring his cause of action within 180 days of
the alleged discriminatory conduct, as required in a Title VII action. 698 F.2d at 678; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (specifying limitations period for Title VII action).
74. See 698 F.2d at 678-79 (scrutinizing objectives and procedural aspects of § 49B and § 1981).
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apply agency limitations periods to actions based upon section 1981.1' The
Fourth Circuit's decision will not dictate the outcome in similar controversies
because federal courts must make an original determination of which limita-
tions period to apply, based on the state statutes available for consideration.
76
The McNutt holding, however, decreases the possibility that courts will apply
administrative agency limitations to a federal cause of action and establishes
a principle for a process that has few guidelines. 77 Since most statutes of limita-
tions applicable to civil actions are longer than agency limitations, the Fourth
Circuit's decision affords plaintiffs more time to file section 1981 suits and
lengthens the time defendants must be prepared to defend such actions. 78 The
Fourth Circuit's decision in McNutt is consistent with the majority of circuit
court decisions and affirms the Supreme Court's opinion that administrative
and judicial remedies are distinct. 79
ANN-MAIm GRANDE
B. Statutes of Limitations and Private Actions Under Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968'
prohibits surreptitious interception of private conversations.2 Congress enacted
Title III in part to prevent unwarranted invasions of privacy. 3 In addition
75. 698 F.2d at 678.
76. Compare Runyon v. McCrary, 515 F.2d 1082, 1097 (4th Cir. 1975) (Virginia's two-year
limitation period applicable to personal injury applied to actin based on § 1981), aff'd, 427 U.S.
460 (1976) with McNutt v. Duke Precision Denial and Orthodontic Laboratories, 698 F.2d 676,
677 (4th Cir. 1983) (three-year limitation period applicable to civil actions without periods of
limitation applied to § 1981 action).
77. See 698 F.2d at 678 (concluding that six-month agency limitations period is inappropriate
for § 1981 actions); see also Grattan v. Burnett, 710 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1983) (reaffirming
decision in McNutt that six-month agency limitations period is inappropriate for civil rights actions).
78. See supra note 31 (state civil rights action statutes generally provide longer limitations
period than agency statutes provide).
79. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court's decisions
on judicial and administrative remedies).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. See id. § 2511(1)(a) (any person who willfully intercepts wire or oral communication
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both). Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 defines oral communication
as any communication uttered with the justifiable expectation of privacy. Id. § 2510(2). Title
III prohibits the disclosure of the contents of an oral communication intercepted in violation
of Title III. Id. § 2511(1)(c).
3. See S. RaP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 2112, 2153 (Title III has dual purpose of protecting private communications and
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to specifying criminal sanctions, Title III provides aggrieved individuals with
a broad range of private remedies.' In providing a private cause of action
for violation of Title III, however, Congress did not specify a limitations period
on Title III actions.' When Congress fails to include a limitations period on
a federal cause of action, the federal courts will borrow the limitation period
that governs the most closely analogous state action.6 In Brown v. American
delineating circumstances in which government and private parties may intercept communica-
tions). Congress enacted Title III in response to two Supreme Court opinions that threatened
the government's ability to combat organized crime through the use of evidence obtained by
means of surreptitious interception of private communications. Id. at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (govern-
ment violated suspect's fourth amendment rights by surreptitiously monitoring conversations in
which suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy); Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41, 58-60
(1967) (state violated suspect's fourth amendment rights by surreptitiously monitoring conversa-
tions under authority of statute that permitted excessively broad intrusions).
As originally proposed, Title III did not forbid a participant in a conversation or a person
acting with the consent of a participant in a conversation from secretly monitoring a conversa-
tion. See S. RE'. No. 1097, supra, at 175-76, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2112, 2236-37 (Sen. Phillip Hart's views regarding consensual wiretapping and eavesdropping).
Senator Hart asserted that to permit monitoring with the consent of a participant would be to
condone private invasions of privacy. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2112,
2236-37. In response to Senator Hart's assertions, Congress amended the proposed bill to pro-
hibit consensual monitoring when the recording party acts with a criminal, tortious, or injurious
purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1976).
Under the common-law tort of invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping of a person's
conversations in his own home constitutes an impermissible intrusion. See Hamberger v. Eastman,
106 N.H. 107, -, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (1964). In Hamberger, the plaintiffs stated a cause of
action by alleging that the defendant, who was the plaintiffs' landlord, secretly placed microphones
in the plaintiffs' bedroom. Id. at -, 206 A.2d at 242. Although the Hamberger defendant
physically entered the private quarters of the plaintiffs, the Hamberger court recognized that
technology permits the invasion of privacy without physical entrance onto private property. Id.
at -, 206 A.2d at 242. Under the common-law, a person retains a sphere of privacy even
while in a public place. See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 570, 255 N.E.2d
765, 771 (1970) (plaintiff stated cause of action by alleging that defendant, as part of general
scheme of surveillance and harassment, tried to observe plaintiff's transactions at bank teller's
window). The common-law invasion of privacy doctrine recognizes that personal information
voluntarily revealed to another loses its private character if the party receiving the information
chooses to reveal it to others. Id at 568-69, 255 N.E.2d at 770 (person revealing private informa-
tion assumes risk that friend or acquaintance might breach confidence). In Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., the defendant news reporters gained permission to enter the plaintiff's home by ruse, and
surreptitiously recorded and photographed the plaintiff. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,
245.46 (9th Cir. 1971). The Dietemann court found that although the plaintiff admitted the defen-
dants voluntarily and although other parties were present in the plaintiff's home, the plaintiff
reasonably could expect that his guests were not eavesdroppers. Id. at 249. The court therefore
held that under California law, the defendants' actions constituted a tortious invasion of privacy.
Id. at 248.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976) (person whose communications are intercepted may recover
$100 for each day of interception, actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees).
5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Title III does not include statute
of limitations); Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (Title III provides no statute of limitations).
6. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 (1981) (timeliness of suit
brought under § 301(a) of Labor Management Relations Act determined by reference to state
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Broadcasting Co.,' the Fourth Circuit considered whether Virginia's statute
of limitations barred the plaintiffs recovery for an alleged violation of Title
III.' The Brown court also considered whether Virginia recognizes a common-
law cause of action for invasion of privacy. 9
In Brown, employees of the House of Representatives Select Committee
on Aging (Committee) invited an American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
news team to participate as observers in the Committee's investigation of
fraudulent practices in sales of insurance to the elderly." At a meeting set
up by the Committee, ABC secretly videotaped the plaintiff, an insurance sales
representative. I On two days in November of 1978, ABC broadcast approx-
imately ten seconds of Brown's sales presentation on the ABC Nightly News
as part of a report on insurance and the elderly.12 Although the ten second
segment clearly portrayed Brown, the plaintiff, the report did not identify
Brown otherwise.' 3 Brown did not learn of the taping or the broadcast until
September 1980, when an attorney for another insurance agent whom ABC
had taped under similar circumstances contacted Brown. 4
Brown filed a diversity action in federal district court in January of 1981,
more than two years after the surreptitious taping and broadcast.' 5 Brown
asserted several state claims including common-law invasion of privacy.' 6 Brown
statute of limitations); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980) (in suit brought
under Civil Rights Act, court must borrow state statute of limitations governing analogous state
cause of action); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (same);
Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (under
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Act, state statute of limitations governing most closely analogous
state cause of action determines limitations period).
7. 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1982).
8. Id. at 1304-05.
9. Id. at 1302-03.
10. Id. at 1298-99. In Brown, the House of Representatives Select Committee on aging
(Committee) was investigating the practice of "overloading" elderly customers with unnecessary
and expensive insurance policies. Id.
11. Id. at 1299. In Brown, a Committee employee had arranged a sales meeting with Brown,
the plaintiff, on the pretext that the employee's mother-in-law wanted to review her insurance
coverage. Id. An elderly Committee employee met with Brown at the Alexandria, Virginia home
of another Committee employee. Id. The Committee employees had given ABC permission to
install a video recording camera behind a two-way mirror in the house. Id. ABC recorded the
entire meeting, which lasted one and one-half hours. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Appellant at 10, Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th
Cir. 1983).
15. 704 F.2d at 1299. Brown filed her complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland. Brief for Appellees at 2, Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704
F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1982). The Maryland district court found that venue was improper and transfer-
red the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.
16. 704 F.2d at 1299. In addition to bringing suit for invasion of privacy, Brown sued
ABC and the Committee employees under Virginia law for conspiracy to injure reputation, defama-
tion, intentional interference with business, and conspiracy to interfere with business. Id. The
district court dismissed Brown's claims for conspiracy to injure reputation and defamation. Id.
The district court held that Brown's claims for conspiracy to injure reputation and defamation
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also claimed that ABC and the Committee employees had violated Title III
accrued at the time of the broadcasts in November 1978. Id The district court did not decide
whether Virginia's one or two year statute of limitations governed Brown's claims for injury
to reputation and defamation because Brown had filed both claims more than two years after
the causes of action had accrued. Id. at 1299; see VA. CODE § 8.01-243(A) (1977) (Virginia pro-
vides two-year limitation period on actions for personal injury); id. § 8.01-248 (Virginia provides
one-year limitation on actions for which no other limitation is specified).
The district court ruled that Virginia's five-year statute of limitations for injury to property
governed Brown's claims for intentional interference with business and conspiracy to interfere
with business. 704 F.2d at 1303; see VA. CODE § 8.01-243(B) (1977) (Virginia provides five-year
statute of limitations for injury to property). The district court permitted the jury to hear the
interference with business and conspiracy claims since Brown had filed suit within the five-year
period. Id. at 1299. The jury found for the defendants on both claims. Id.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Brown challenged the dismissal of her claims for conspiracy
to injure reputation and defamation. Id. Brown asserted that these claims had not accrued until
September of 1980 when she learned of the taping and suffered emotional distress. Id. at 1299-1300.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Brown's asserted accrual date because the broadcast of Brown's pic-
ture constituted the final element of the torts of injury to reputation and defamation. Id. at
1300. The Fourth Circuit therefore held that the statute of limitations barred Brown's claims
for injury to reputation and defamation because the causes of action had accrued in November
1978, more than two years before the time at which Brown filed her claims. Id. at 1299.
On appeal, Brown raised an additional claim under Virginia law. id. at 1303. Brown claimed
that ABC's use of Brown's picture constituted a violation of a Virginia statute that prohibited
the use of a person's likeness for advertising or commercial purposes without the person's con-
sent. Id.; see VA. CODE § 8.01-40 (1977 & Supp. 1982) (nonconsensual use of person's image
for advertising or commercial purposes constitutes tortious and criminal violation of law). The
Fourth Circuit refused to consider the statutory claim since Brown had failed to raise the claim
during trial. 704 F.2d at 1303. Brown also urged the Fourth Circuit to vacate the jury verdict
and remand the case for retrial on her claims for intentional interference with business and con-
spiracy to interfere with business. Brief for Appellant at 18, Brown v. American Broadcasting
Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1982). Brown contended that the district court erred in refusing
to permit Brown's expert witness to testify because of Brown's failure to comply with a pretrial
order. 704 F.2d at 1298. Brown's expert witness planned to testify regarding Brown's claims for
intentional interference with business and conspiracy to interfere with business. Id. at 1305. Since
the Fourth Circuit held that the statute of limitations should have barred these claims, the Fourth
Circuit refused to consider whether the district court improperly excluded the expert's testimony
regarding these claims. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, ordered the district court to provide
additional time for discovery prior to retrial of the Title III claim. Id.
The defendants challenged the district court's application of Virginia's five-year statute of
limitations to Brown's claims for intentional interference with business and conspiracy to in-
terfere with business. Id. at 1303. The defendants asserted that Virginia's one and two-year statutes
of limitations governed these claims because the claims were merely reiterations of Brown's defama-
tion claim. Brief for Appellee at 30, Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th
Cir. 1982). The Fourth Circuit agreed with the defendants and held that Virginia's five-year statute
of limitations was inapplicable to a situation in which the plaintiff's underlying claim was actually
for a personal injury. 704 F.2d at 1303. The Fourth Circuit therefore denied Brown's request
for retrial on these claims. Id. at 1304.
The Brown defendants also asserted that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the ABC news reporter who was present at the taping session. Id. at 1300. The defendants claimed
that the reporter's presence at the taping session constituted insufficient contact with Virginia
to subject the reporter to the jurisdiction of a Virginia court. Id at 1300-01. The Brown court
rejected the defendants' argument, holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction
over the ABC news reporter. Id. at 1300-02. The court reasoned that a violation of Title III
constituted a tort within the meaning of Virginia's long-arm statute, thereby authorizing a court
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by surreptitiously taping the sales meeting." The district court dismissed
Brown's claims for invasion of privacy and violation of Title III on the grounds
that Virginia's one and two year statutes of limitations on these claims had
elapsed by the time Brown had filed suit.'" On appeal to the Fourth Circuit,
Brown challenged the dismissal of her claims for common-law invasion of
privacy and violation of Title III.19 The defendants cross-appealed, contend-
ing that the district court erred in assuming that Virginia recognized a common-
law cause of action for invasion of privacy. 20
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court properly
dismissed the common-law invasion of privacy claim, but that the statute
of limitations constituted the wrong reason for dismissal. 2' The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that a common-law cause of action for invasion of privacy does
not exist in Virginia.22 The Brown court recognized that although the Virginia
Supreme Court never has addressed the issue, several federal district courts
have ruled that Virginia recognizes only a narrow, statutory cause of action
for invasion of privacy.23 The Fourth Circuit's decision, therefore, denied
to assert jurisdiction. Id. at 1301. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the exercise of jurisdiction
over a defendant based on a single transaction does not offend due process when the single trans-
action gives rise to the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff. Id at 1302. See generally Worldwide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (due process clause limits power of state
court to render valid personal judgment over non-resident defendant).
17. 704 F.2d at 1299.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1302.
21. Id. at 1302-03.
22. Id. at 1303.
23. Id.; see infra note 62 (citing Federal District Court cases that hold that no common-law
cause of action for invasion of privacy exists in Virginia). In Brown, the Fourth Circuit recognized
that the Virginia legislature has enacted a limited statutory right of privacy. Id. at 1302; see VA.
CODE § 8.01-40 (1977 & Supp. 1982). Section 8.01-40 prohibits the unauthorized use of a person's
name, portrait or picture for the purposes of trade or advertising. Id. Section 8.01-40 authorizes
issuance of an injunction and award of both compensatory and exemplary damages if the defen-
dant knowingly violates the statute. Id. Section 18.2-216.1 provides for a minimum fine of $50
and a maximum of $1,000 for knowingly using a person's likeness without consent. VA. CODE
§ 18.2-216.1 (1982).
The Virginia legislature enacted the Virginia privacy statute in 1904 based on a similar statute
which the New York legislature had enacted two years earlier. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§
50, 51 (Consol. 1976 & Supp. 1982). The New York legislature enacted the statute in response
to the public outrage that followed the New York Court of Appeals' opinion in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS § 117, at 803 (4th ed. 1971). In Roberson the court held that no common-law
right of privacy existed and therefore rejected a woman's invasion of privacy claim against a
company that used the woman's picture for advertising purposes without her consent. Roberson,
171 N.Y. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447-48.
In addition to acknowledging that the federal courts that have construed Virginia law uniformly
have rejected a common-law privacy action, the Fourth Circuit recognized that recent federal
interpretations of New York law do not indicate a probable change in Virginia law. 704 F.2d
at 1302-03. The Fourth Circuit correctly held that the New York state courts do not recognize
the common-law tort of invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y.
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Brown relief on her invasion of privacy claim. 24
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's dismissal of
Brown's federal claim for violation of Title III.25 The Brown court recognized
that state statutes of limitations govern a Title III action, but held that federal
law controls the time of accrual of federal causes of action. 26 The Brown court
held that the federal discovery rule controls accrual of a cause of action for
surreptitious interception under Title III.27 The discovery rule states that a
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of due
diligence could have discovered, that someone had intercepted his or her private
communications. 28 The Brown court rejected the rulings of several other cir-
cuits which hold that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
the interception and may be tolled if the defendant fraudulently conceals
29
the existence of facts that constitute the cause of action .3 The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, remanded the case to determine when Brown discovered or could
have discovered the existence of the cause of action.
31
2d 858, 860, 374 N.E.2d 129, 130, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1978) (no right to relief for invasion
of privacy exists in New York except under statute); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482,
484, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (1982) (psychiatrist's disclosure of patient's confidential information
not actionable under invasion of privacy theory); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 78 A.D.2d
839, 840, 433 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (1980) (no right of privacy exists other than statutory rights);
see also Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy-The Need for Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv.
159, 160-61 (1975) (although majority of states recognize a common-law right of privacy, New
York courts have rejected common-law cause of action).
24. 704 F.2d at 1303; see also supra note 16 (Fourth Circuit denied Brown's state-law claims
for conspiracy to injure reputation, defamation, intentional interference with business, and con-
spiracy to interfere with business).
25. 704 F.2d at 1304-05.
26. Id. at 1304.
27. Id. The Brown court held that a cause of action for violation of Title InI accrues when
a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known of the existence of a cause of action. Id.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the tort of surreptitious interception of private communications
by its nature remains concealed from potential plaintiffs. Id. The Brown court found that unless
a Title III defendant takes affirmative steps to reveal the interception, the tort may remain con-
cealed. Id. The Brown court, therefore held that the discovery rule governs accrual of an action
for violation of Title III. Id.
28. Id.; see Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 609 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (cause of action for violation of Title III accrues when plaintiff discovers or by exercise
of due diligence could have discovered interception). Although the Fourth Circuit held that the
statute of limitations did not begin to run on the Title III action until Brown should have discovered
the existence of the surreptitious taping, the Brown court never specified which Virginia statute
of limitations governed the Title III action. 704 F.2d at 1304-05; see supra note 16 (describing
Virginia limitations statutes).
29. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (defining fraudulent concealment doctrine).
30. 704 F.2d at 1304; see Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(fraudulent concealment tolls running of statute of limitations in surreptitious monitoring action);
Cole v. Kelley, 438 F. Supp. 129, 138 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (same).
31. 704 F.2d at 1304-05. The Brown court held that the discovery rule governs accrual
of a Title III claim. Id. at 1304. The court therefore instructed that on remand the jury should
determine when Brown knew or should have known of the monitoring. Id. The Brown defen-
dants, however, contended that § 2511(2)(d) of Title III relieved the defendants from liability
because all of the participants in the taping, except for Brown, had consented to having their
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The distinction between accrual and tolling is significant because federal
law determines the time of accrual of a federal claim 32 whereas state law general-
ly governs tolling.33 A cause of action accrues when the defendant commits
acts that give rise to liability and the plaintiff can maintain a suit.34 The statute
of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. 3 A tolling prin-
ciple suspends the running of a statute of limitations. 36 The doctrine of
fraudulent concealment is an example of a tolling principle. 7 Fraudulent con-
cealment occurs when the defendant intentionally conceals from the victim
the existence of facts that otherwise would inform the victim that the defen-
dant had committed a wrong.38 The suspended statute of limitations begins
to run anew only when the victim discovers or, by the exercise of due diligence,
should have discovered the existence of a claim.
39
Precedent indicates that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is an im-
portant federal policy.4" The federal interest in applying the fraudulent con-
cealment doctrine historically has outweighed the federal interest in applying
conversations monitored. Id. at 1305; see 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (1976) (Title III permits consen-
sual monitoring if not intended for criminal, tortious, or injurious purpose). The Fourth Circuit
rejected the defendants' assertions that § 251 1(2)(D) relieved the defendants of liability as a mat-
ter of law. 704 F.2d at 1305. The Brown court held that a jury must decide whether the defen-
dants monitored the conversation for the purpose of committing any criminal, tortious, or in-
jurious act. Id.
32. See e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947) (federal law determines when
state statute of limitations begins to run on federal cause of action); United Klans of America
v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 153 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (federal law controls accrual
of federal cause of action); Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 607
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (same); see also C. WRIGT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 394 & n.38 (4th
ed. 1983) (federal law governs accrual of federal claims).
33. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-92 (1980) (federal courts must
adopt state tolling doctrine along with state statute of limitations unless tolling doctrine is incon-
sistent with federal policy); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975) (state
limitation period is interrelated with state tolling and revival provisions).
34. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941).
35. Id.
36. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
37. See Marcus, Fraudulent concealment in Federal Cases: Toward A More Disparate Stan-
dard?, 71 GEo. L.J. 829, 830 (1983) (wrongdoer's fraudulent concealment of basis for claim
may permit plaintiff to assert cause of action after statute of limitations has expired).
38. Id.; see Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (fraudulent conceal-
ment occurred when defendants confronted plaintiff with false evidence of plaintiff's homosexuality
in order to induce plaintiff to resign from government employment).
39. See Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's discovery of secret
memorandum indicating that defendants fabricated accusations of homosexuality against plain-
tiff revived statute of limitations). See generally Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes
of Limitation, 31 MIcH. L. Ray. 875 (1933) (discussing origins of fraudulent concealment doctrine).
40. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (in cases arising in equity, court
will read doctrine of fraudulent concealment into every federal statute); Bailey v. Glover, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874) (when defendant fraudulently conceals basis for claim, statute
of limitations shall not run against plaintiff); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d
80, 83 (2d Cir.) (in cases arising at law, court will read doctrine of fraudulent concealment into
every federal statute), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
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state tolling principles.4 ' The Supreme Court recently has stated, however,
that federal courts applying state statutes of limitations should apply state
tolling principles. 2 After stating this rule, the Supreme Court has not reaf-
firmed the validity of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. 43 By basing Brown
on accrual principles which are governed by federal law, the Fourth Circuit
avoided potential inconsistencies with Supreme Court doctrine.
4 4
The federal courts that have discussed the time of accrual of a claim for
surreptitious interception have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the
time at which the statute of limitations begins to run.45 In Clark v. United
States,4 6 the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
a Title III claim against several Watergate conspirators accrued when the defen-
41. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing seminal fraudulent concealment
cases). Several courts have held that fraudulent concealment suspends the statute of limitations
on Title III actions. See Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (secrecy surround-
ing Watergate wiretap scheme constituted fraudulent concealment), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1095-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (although cause of
action for surreptitious wiretap accrues at time of interception, existence of fraudulent conceal-
ment will toll statute of limitations); Cole v. Kelley, 438 F. Supp. 129, 138-40 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
(tolling of statute by fraudulent concealment ends when victim could have acquired knowledge
of potential claim).
In Smith v. Nixon, columnist Hedrick Smith sued former President Nixon and other Watergate
conspirators for tapping Smith's phone. 606 F.2d at 1186-87. The Smith court found that Title
III imposes upon the government a duty to inform affected parties that the government has in-
tercepted their conversations. Id. at 1190; see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976) (government promptly
must notify parties affected by judicially authorized interception). The Smith court determined
that the existence of fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations. 606 F.2d at 1190-91.
Section 2518(8)(d), however, only applies when the government seeks to intercept communica-
tions pursuant to a valid warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). Section 2518(8)(d) does
not apply to cases involving consensual monitoring for which Title III requires no warrant. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976) (person acting under color of law does not violate Title III by
making consensual recording); Id. § 2511 (2Xd) (private party does not violate Title III by making
consensual recording unless he records with injurious, tortious, or criminal purpose). The Smith
court's holding that Title III requires the disclosure of the interception, therefore, is probably
inapplicable to Brown, which involved consensual recording.
42. See supra note 33 (citing cases in which Supreme Court recently has held that federal
courts must adopt state tolling principles as well as statutes of limitation).
43. See Marcus, supra note 37, at 834 (recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on con-
tinued validity of federal fraudulent concealment doctrine); C. WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 395
n.41 (suggesting that recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on continued applicability of
fraudulent concealment doctrine).
44. Compare Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947) (federal law controls when state
statute of limitations begins to run on federal cause of action) with Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478, 483-92 (1980) (federal courts must borrow state tolling doctrine when courts borrow
state statutes of limitations).
45. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (discussing Title III accrual cases). Com-
pare Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 609 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (cause
of action for surreptitious wiretap accrues when plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of due
diligence could have discovered the existence of the interception) with Clark v. United States,
481 F. Supp. 1086, 1094-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (illegal wiretap action accrues at time of interception
because cause of action for illegal wiretap is not inherently impossible for plaintiff to ascertain).
46. 481 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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dants committed illegal surveillance.4 7 The court held that the statute of limita-
tions began to run at the time of interception, but could be tolled if the plain-
tiff showed fraudulent concealment."8 The Clark court distinguished cases in
which other federal courts had adopted the discovery rule, reasoning that the
discovery rule only applied to claims that were physically impossible to detect
until some time after the tort occurred. 49 The Clark court found that because
the occurrence of the interception was humanly knowable, the plaintiff's
discovery of the interceptions was not physically impossible. 0 In Awbrey v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,' however, the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia applied the discovery rule in a case in which
the plaintiffs alleged that their employer had violated Title III by taping the
plaintiffs' telephone conversations.- 2 The Awbrey court rejected the fraudulent
concealment doctrine, noting that a violation of Title HI normally is conceal-
ed from the plaintiff.53 The court reasoned that a defendant would not have
to commit any acts of concealment to maintain the secrecy of the violation.
5 4
Furthermore, the A wbrey court found that the courts that relied on the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations in a Title
III action reached the same result that they would have reached if the courts
had applied the discovery rule. 5 The Awbrey court, therefore, held that the
47. Id. at 1094. In Clark, eight members of the "New Left" sued former President Nixon
and various other federal officials for violating Title III and the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Id. at 1090. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had burglarized the plaintiffs' homes and
installed illegal wiretaps. Id.
48. Id. at 1094; accord Cole v. Kelley, 438 F. Supp. 129, 138-40 (D.C. Cal. 1977).
49. 481 F. Supp. at 1093-94; see, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (discovery
rule determines accrual of statute of limitations when plaintiff alleges injury due to silicosis);
Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1971) (discovery rule determines accrual when
plaintiff alleges medical malpractice under Federal Tort Claims Act); Hammond v. United States,
388 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (discovery rule determines time of accrual for claim of
negligent administration of polio vaccine).
50. 481 F. Supp. at 1094-95. Although the Clark court held that a cause of action for
violation of Title III accrues at the time of interception, the court found that the defendants
allegedly had committed fraudulent concealment. Id. at 1095. The Clark court therefore held
that fraudulent concealment had tolled the statute of limitations. Id.
51. 505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
52. Id. at 606, 609. In A wbrey, the plaintiffs complained that their employer violated 'title
III by installing wiretaps on the employer's telephones and taping the personal conversations
of the employees. Id. at 606.
53. Id. at 609.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (fraudulent concealment
tolled statute of limitations), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Clark v. United States, 481 F.
Supp. 1086, 1094-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (although cause of action for surreptitious wiretap accrued
at time of interception, existence of fraudulent concealment tolled statute of limitations); Cole
v. Kelley, 438 F. Supp. 129, 138-40 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (tolling of statute of limitations by fraudulent
concealment ended when victim could have acquired knowledge of potential claims); see also
United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 153-54 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (when
U.S. Attorney General announced intention at press conference to use counterintelligence unit
to crack down on "white hate" groups, Ku Klux Klan should have known that it would be target
of government's program and therefore should have known of basis for claim).
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discovery rule determines the time of accrual of a claim for violation of Title
111.6
The legislative history of Title III reflects the same concern expressed by
the Awbrey court that surreptitious interceptions of private communications
frequently remain unknown.57 The drafters of Title III emphasized that Title
III should deny an intruder the fruits of his unlawful actions." The discovery
rule effectuates Title III's broad remedial and punitive plan by avoiding the
fraudulent concealment doctrine's requireiient that the plaintiff prove that
the defendant intentionally concealed the existence of the interception. 9 The
discovery rule focuses solely on whether the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the interception.
60
In addition to adopting the discovery rule as the rule governing accrual
of a Title III action, the Brown court acknowledged that no Virginia state
court ever has recognized a common-law privacy action. 6' The Brown court's
rejection of the common-law privacy action is consistent with the holdings
of every federal court that has considered whether Virginia courts would
recognize a privacy action.62 Furthermore, the only Virginia court that has
considered the privacy claim held that no common-law right to privacy exists
in Virginia.
61
56. 505 F. Supp. at 609.
57. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2112, 2156 (invasion of privacy by surreptitious monitoring frequently will remain
unknown).
58. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112, 2156.
59. See Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 608-09 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (discovery rule best effectuates federal policy expressed in Title III); supra note 4 and
accompanying text (Title III provides broad range of criminal and civil sanctions); see also Alioto
v. Holzman, 54 F.R.D. 602, 604 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (plaintiff's cause of action for electronic
eavesdropping did not accrue until plaintiff learned of facts constituting cause of action).
60. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (comparing discovery rule cases with
fraudulent concealment cases).
61. 704 F.2d at 1303; see Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (W.D. Va. 1977)
(common-law action for invasion of privacy does not exist in Virginia); Comment, The Case
for a Broader Right of Privacy in Virginia, 7 Whi. & MARY L. REv. 127, 134 (1966) (existence
of common-law cause of action for invasion of privacy is doubtful because Virginia Supreme
Court has not recognized common-law privacy action and sole Virginia case addressing issue
held that no common-law privacy action exists); W. PRossER, HAN1DBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 117 (4th ed. 1971) (Virginia does not recognize common-law right of privacy).
62. See Falwell v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (W.D. Va. 1981)
(Virginia recognizes no common-law right to privacy); Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434, 440
(E.D. Va. 1980) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Mandelkorn v. Ward, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213
(AV.D. Va. 1977) (same); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 829 (D.D.C.
1955) (same), aff'd, 232 F. 2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956).
63. See Cyrus v. The Boston Chemical Co., 11 VA. L. REG. 938 (Richmond Equity Court
1905) (otherwise unreported) (no right of action for invasion of privacy exists except for right
created by statute for unauthorized use of one's picture for advertising purposes), cited in Note,
The Virginia "Right of Privacy" Statute, 38 VA. L. REv. 117, 118 & n.14 (1952). The summary
of the holding of Cyrus v. The Boston Chemical Co. in the Virginia Law Register is the only
printed record of a Virginia state court's consideration of the topic of a right to privacy.
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